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Regulation, Renegotiation, and Reform: Improving
Transnational Public-Private Partnerships in the Wake of
the Gulf Oil Spill†
JOHN J. MCKINLAY*
INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 2010, British Petroleum managers aboard the Deepwater Horizon
congratulated the rig’s workers for their stellar safety record: they had operated
seven years without a single workplace injury.1 A few hours after that evening’s
celebration, a high-pressure bubble of methane gas rose three miles through the
Deepwater Horizon’s drill column, destroying a previously damaged blowout
preventer on its way upward.2 When the bubble reached the surface of the rig and
ignited, the “blowout”3 caused a massive explosion that killed eleven rig workers,
injured sixteen others,4 and unleashed the largest oil spill in American history.5
Regarding the physical mechanics of the blowout, the U.S. government and British
Petroleum (BP) recognize that preexisting safety measures could have prevented
the Deepwater Horizon disaster.6 Regarding the legal mechanics of regulation
before and liability after the Gulf Oil Spill (“the Spill”), however, lawmakers are
too willing to embrace the regulatory status quo.
In the wake of the disaster, BP; its partners Halliburton,7 Mitsui,8 Transocean,9
Anadarko;10 and the U.S. government scrambled to simultaneously contain the

† Copyright © 2012 John J. McKinlay.
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2012, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. Thanks to
Professor Aman for his substantive insight, and the editorial staff and associates of the
Indiana Law Journal for their diligence in bringing this Note to publication. I would also
like to thank Marie Jurcin, Diane Jurcin, Garrett Hahn, and Hera Lee for their ceaseless
support.
1. Blowout: The Deepwater Horizon Disaster, CBSNEWS (Sept. 21, 2010, 1:16 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/16/60minutes/main6490197.shtml.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Carl Hoffman, Investigative Report: How the BP Oil Rig Blowout Happened,
(Sept.
2,
2010,
12:00
PM),
POPULARMECHANICS.COM
http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/coal-oil-gas/how-the-bp-oil-rig-blowouthappened.
5. Matthew Scott, BP’s Gulf Oil Spill Worst in U.S. History, DAILY FIN. (May 27,
2010, 12:15 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/05/27/bps-gulf-oil-spill-worst-in-u-shistory/.
6. See Henry Fountain & Tom Zeller, Jr., Panel Suggests Signs of Trouble Before Rig
Blast, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2010, at A1.
7. Peter J. Henning, Looking for Liability in BP’s Gulf Oil Spill, NYTIMES.COM (June
7, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/looking-for-liability-in-bpsgulf-oil-spill/.
8. See Tom Bergin, BP Cuts Oil Spill Burden with £677 Million Mitsui Deal,
REUTERS.COM (May 20, 2011, 10:40 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/05/20/uk-bpmitsui-idUKTRE74J11I20110520.
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disaster and either reduce or avoid environmental and economic liability for it.11 BP
waged a public relations campaign,12 likely aimed at keeping its stock price up13
and perception of the Spill’s severity down.14 Undoubtedly, BP’s managers
calculated the company’s potential criminal liability—based on the volume of oil
spilled—under measures such as the Clean Water Act15 and Migratory Bird Treaty
Act.16 The Obama Administration (“Administration”), which had recently
exempted BP from key oversight and preparedness requirements,17 reprised its
oversight role with a vengeance. President Obama declared a moratorium on
deepwater drilling in coastal waters surrounding the United States.18 The
government later lifted the moratorium after adopting “new regulatory measures.”19
Oil extractors and environmental groups alternatively praised and decried the
Administration’s reversal.20 The Administration also quickly disbanded the
Minerals Management Service (MMS)21 and rechristened it the Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE).22 The commission
9. See Hoffman, supra note 4.
10. See Chris Kahn, BP Partners Refuse to Help Pay for Gulf Oil Spill, HUFFINGTON
POST (July 13, 2010, 4:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/13/bp-partnersmoex-anadarko_n_645117.html.
11. See, e.g., John Schwartz, BP Bills Its Partners for a Share of the Oil Spill Cost, N.Y.
TIMES, July 5, 2010, at A10 (discussing BP’s attempts to spread liability costs among its
partners and its insurer in the face of the U.S. government billing BP for costs associated
with the Gulf Oil Spill).
12. See Cain Burdeau, BP Ad Campaign Following Gulf Oil Spill Deemed
‘Propaganda’ by Some, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 8, 2012, 11:38 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/08/bp-ad-campaign-gulf-oil-_n_1192600.html.
13. See Oil Spill Hits BP’s Stock, Threatens Its Future, LAWYERS.COM,
http://securities.lawyers.com/Securities/Oil-Spill-Hits-BPs-Stock-Threatens-Its-Future.html.
14. See Helen Pidd, BP Oil Spill Estimates Double: US Government Figures Show
Twice as Much Oil Spewing into the Gulf of Mexico Than Earlier Estimations Suggested,
THE GUARDIAN (June 11, 2010, 10:07 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2010/jun/11/bp-oil-spill-estimates-double.
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2006).
16. 16 U.S.C. § 707.
17. See Juliet Eilperin, U.S. Exempted BP’s Gulf of Mexico Drilling from Environmental
Impact Study, WASH. POST (May 5, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/05/04/AR2010050404118.html?hpid=topnews. BP received a
“categorical exclusion” from the National Environmental Policy Act’s requirement for
environmental impact studies due to the perceived unlikelihood of a large spill in the region.
See id.
18. Bryan Walsh, Obama Issues New Offshore Drilling Moratorium, TIME.COM (July
12, 2010, 8:27 PM), http://ecocentric.blogs.time.com/2010/07/12/obama-issues-newoffshore-drilling-moratorium/.
19. Peter Baker & John M. Broder, U.S. Lifts the Ban on Deep Drilling, with New Rules,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2010, at A1.
20. See id. (discussing views of proponents and opponents of the moratorium).
21. See Perry Bacon Jr., David A. Fahrenthold & Steven Mufson, Lawmakers Assail
Minerals Management Service, WASH. POST (May 26, 2010, 4:16 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/26/AR2010052602787.
html.
22. Neil King, Jr., Salazar Renames MMS, Adding ‘Regulation and Enforcement’,

2012]

REGULATION, RENEGOTIATION, AND REFORM

1317

tasked with investigating the Spill found that MMS’s and BP’s “shared failure”
caused the Spill.23
The centerpiece of Congress’s reaction was the Big Oil Bailout Prevention
Liability Act of 2010 (“the 2010 Act”).24 In light of the “laughably low liability
level”25 in place under the controlling Oil Pollution Control Act of 1990 (OPA),26
Senator Robert Menéndez introduced the 2010 Act27 to retroactively increase BP’s
liability cap to $10 billion. Though the original Act was defeated in the Senate in
September 2010,28 Representative Rush Holt reintroduced the proposed legislation
as the Big Oil Bailout Prevention Liability Act of 2011 (“the 2011 Act,” or
alternatively, “the Act”) in the House in January 2011,29 with Senator Menéndez
following suit in the Senate.30 The 2011 Act seeks to remove liability limits
altogether.31 Though the 2011 Act has been stalled in committee since the
Republican-controlled Congress was seated in January 2011,32 the very
introduction of the Act indicates a systemic misalignment of incentives and raises
important questions regarding the proper scope and mechanics of public-private
partnership (P3) regulation.
The Act’s proposed retroactive liability provision raises questions about
prospective measures that could better implement public welfare and infrastructure
development aims. This Note proposes that the present regulatory systems
governing transnational P3s, as brought to light by the BP disaster, are costly,
ineffective, and outdated. Furthermore, this Note argues that renegotiation as a
corrective measure should be discontinued inasmuch as it may impose significant
indirect costs on taxpayers—the true public side of a P3. The key to implementing
a system that is efficient and beneficial to both parties of a P3 lies in realigning
incentives of both parties and streamlining the regulatory process through more
front-end participation and less back-end regulation. Part I of this Note examines
WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2010, 5:32 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/06/21/salazarrenames-mms-adding-regulation-and-enforcement/.
23. ‘Shared Failure’ in BP Spill Cited in Panel Report: Reforms Needed Since
‘Oversight Utterly Failed,’ Says Co-chair of Obama Commission, MSNBC.COM (Jan. 11,
2011, 11:34 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41020738/ns/us_news-environment.
24. Big Oil Bailout Prevention Liability Act of 2010, S. 3305, 111th Cong. (2010).
25. Katarzyna Klimasinska & Noah Buhayar, ‘Laughably Low’ Spill Liability Cap
Spurs U.S. Debate After BP, STUART SMITH BLOG (Feb. 10, 2011) (citing Rep. Rush Holt),
http://www.stuarthsmith.com/‘laughably-low’-spill-liability-cap-spurs-u-s-debate-after-bp.
26. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2006) (setting liability limits for offshore facilities such as
the Deepwater Horizon at removal costs plus $75 million).
27. S. 3305 (proposing a retroactive increase of the liability cap for deepwater oil spills
from $75 million to $10 billion).
28. Geoff Holtzman, Oil Spill Commission Suggests Raising Liability Cap, TALK RADIO
NEWS SERVICE (Jan. 11, 2011, 11:44 AM), http://www.talkradionews.com/quicknews/
2011/1/11/oil-spill-commission-suggests-raising-liability-cap.html.
29. H.R. 492, 112th Cong. (2011).
30. S. 214, 112th Cong. (2011).
31. See H.R. 492 (proposing removal of liability cap effectuated at 33 U.S.C.
§ 2704(a)(3)).
32. The bill, with twenty-three Democratic co-sponsors and no Republican sponsors,
was referred to the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on January 26,
2011. See H.R. 492. No action on the bill has since been taken. See id.
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the nature of P3s in the United States and that of the MMS/BP arrangement in
particular. Part II discusses American P3 regulation, its limitations, and potential
improvements that can be made. Part III addresses detrimental effects of the United
States’ actions and suggests reforms to benefit both public and private parties in
future P3 arrangements. Part IV utilizes scholarship from corporate governance,
transnational legal pluralism, and notions of the government as a fiduciary to
anticipate objections to reform and suggest means to overcome them.
I. P3S: RATIONALES, RISKS, AND RENEGOTIATION
The rationale underlying the formation of P3s is that private companies partner
with local governments to perform tasks deemed too operationally complex, capital
intensive, or risky for the government to undertake alone.33 Generally speaking,
such arrangements enable public partners to limit expenditures and risks while
receiving royalty payments from the private partner, whereas the private partner is
able to deploy its expertise and capital in operational enterprises34 that promise
sufficiently large returns35 to absorb risk the public partner would otherwise incur.36
In effect, each partner in a P3 arrangement undertakes both public and private law
functions.37
Transnational extraction projects exist in part to implement national energy,
economic, employment, or infrastructure development policies while reducing
industrial development expenditures.38 Within a transnational P3, implementation

33. See JOHN LOXLEY WITH SALIM LOXLEY, PUBLIC SERVICE PRIVATE PROFITS: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN CANADA 176 (2010) (“The
apparent motivation behind the approach [of creating P3s] has shifted to some degree from
an attempt to move infrastructure spending and debt off the government books, to a desire to
reduce costs through transferring risk to the private sector.”); see also MICHAEL B. LIKOSKY,
LAW, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 27–28 (2006) (noting that the Panama Canal
and trans-American railroad construction projects were P3s).
34. See LOXLEY WITH LOXLEY, supra note 33, at 2–3 (“With P3s, the large up-front
capital costs associate with infrastructure projects can . . . be offset and spread over a number
of years through a lease . . . . Private firms can assume responsibility for things that may go
wrong, such as project over-runs, problems resulting from poor construction, etc.”).
35. As Loxley notes, “P3s offer important opportunities for profit-making.” Id. at vii.
36. See R. PRESTON MCAFEE & JOHN MCMILLAN, INCENTIVES IN GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTING 9 (1988).
37. See LIKOSKY, supra note 33, at 23 (“Within PPPs, the interests of governments and
companies are intertwined.”); see also id. at 24 (“[I]n the context of specific PPPs,
companies might combine public and private law powers.”).
38. See id. at 24 (“Commentators have long complained that private companies, for
example, have taken on too many political powers.”). This is especially true in the case of
large companies. See id. It would seem even more relevant in discussing transnational
companies with presumably less incentive to enhance the foreign host country’s public
welfare. See Nick Beermann, Legal Mechanisms of Public-Private Partnerships: Promoting
Economic Development or Benefiting Corporate Welfare?, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 175, 204
(1999) (“Economic development is often advanced as a reason for creating public-private
partnerships.”); G. Allen Brooks, Musings: Future of the Gulf of Mexico Oil & Gas Industry,
RIGZONE (Nov. 12, 2010), http://www.rigzone.com/news/ article.asp?a_id=101257
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of public policy is effectively outsourced to a foreign entity. Ensuring that
transnational partners adequately promote domestic public welfare aims is a
formidable challenge to P3 regulators. One potential solution—exemplified by the
Act—is the threat of renegotiation.39 This Note argues that renegotiation should be
a disfavored mechanism in transnational P3s insofar as it ultimately increases the
costs of business and sustains a regulatory regime unlikely to avert disasters such as
the Spill.
For economic and historical reasons, transnationals like BP are increasingly
important players in capital-intensive industries like mineral extraction.40 In
accordance with the American policy of reducing dependence on foreign oil,41 the
United States tasked BP with accessing its deepwater oil reserves. Typical of such
oil and gas exploration arrangements, BP’s lease to drill for oil in the Gulf of
Mexico is a concessionary lease from the U.S. government agency tasked with
oversight of the arrangement—the MMS/BOEMRE.42 Events surrounding the Spill
demonstrate two dangers inherent in poorly supervised transnational P3 leases: the
private entity may find itself in a position to ignore the host country’s public
welfare aims in light of the company’s profit motive,43 and the public goals of cost
saving and revenue generation incentivize the overseeing agency to become a
(explaining, from the oil industry’s perspective, why deepwater drilling is necessary for
American energy policy).
39. In this context, renegotiation is a unilateral action undertaken by the stronger party.
Prior to the formation of a P3, the government negotiates for favorable conditions based on
anticipated benefit to the country as a stakeholder. See J.J. Boddewyn, Multinational
Business-Government Relations: Six Principles for Effectiveness, in MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND GOVERNMENTS: BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN AN
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 193, 196 (Patrick M. Boarman & Hans Schollhammer eds., 1975).
Risks are assigned as under any contract, and such losses are insured by the insurance
carriers. See generally Ronald J. Daniels & Michael J. Trebilcock, Private Provision of
Public Infrastructure: An Organizational Analysis of the Next Privatization Frontier, 46 U.
TORONTO L.J. 375 (1996). Because of public parties’ sovereign power to rescind a lease
under its own law, expel the private party from its borders, nationalize, or otherwise take
advantage of its relative power, the government may act opportunistically or legitimately to
increase the benefit to the country or allay the damage created by the private partner. See
MICHAEL LIKOSKY, OBAMA’S BANK: FINANCING A DURABLE NEW DEAL 333 (2010) (noting
that many renegotiations are driven by the inequitable flow of benefits to private partners
and risks to the public partners).
40. LOXLEY WITH LOXLEY, supra note 33, at vii (“P3s . . . draw[] on private sector
technical expertise, private sector organizational and management experience and private
sector capital to deliver public services.”).
41. See Kerri Shannon, United States Lifts Oil Drilling Ban to Reduce Foreign Energy
Dependence, MONEY MORNING (Apr. 1, 2010), http://moneymorning.com/2010/04/01/
drilling-ban/.
42. See Dane Hahn, Unraveling BP’s Oil Lease in the Gulf, ENGLEWOOD EDGE (June 8,
2010, 2:19 AM), http://www.englewoodedge.com/2010/06/08/unraveling-bps-oil-lease-inthe-gulf/. A concessionary contract is one in which the “government cedes a mix of
ownership and control over a public activity to a private-sector entity.” See LIKOSKY, supra
note 39, at 189.
43. See Boddewyn, supra note 39, at 196 (noting that successful P3s demand “focusing
on the integration of the guest company into the host economy and society through the
obeying of laws”).
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rubber stamp for the private parties’ wishes.44 The lines between public policy and
profit motive become uncomfortably blurred in a P3, removing incentives for either
party to act in the public interest and instead pursue only monetary gain.45 Leading
up to the Spill, BP avoided meaningful regulation46 to increase its profits and
reduce cost overruns resulting from delays.47 As the world learned in the wake of
the Spill, existing administrative regulations leading up to the disaster were ill
equipped to avoid an otherwise preventable economic and environmental disaster.48
The existence of the 2011 Act indicates the degree to which contract terms and
administrative regulations inadequately accounted for risk to the public.49 Such
shortcomings can only be inferred ex post, however, since the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) generally exempts from public scrutiny sensitive business
information reified in extraction contracts.50 Beyond the structural opaqueness

44. Hahn, supra note 42 (noting that the United States received $34 million as a
prepayment on the lease and was to collect 12.8% of revenues generated from producing
wells drilled by BP in the Macondo tract); see also LOXLEY WITH LOXLEY, supra note 33, at
175 (“One of the most disturbing aspects of P3s is the uniformly abysmal record of
accountability and transparency.”); JULIA STEETS, ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC POLICY
PARTNERSHIPS 39 (2010) (“Public-private policy partnerships must be accountable if they are
to fulfill policy objectives successfully.” (quoting Pauline Vaillancourt)); Eilperin, supra
note 17 (noting the superficial review given BP’s operations before exempting BP from a
mandatory environmental impact study).
45. See LIKOSKY, supra note 33, at 24 (“In each case, the concern is that private
companies are too intermingled with governments and are thus acting as political bodies
exceeding their private law remit.”); see also generally Klaus Dingwerth & Tine Hanreider,
Public Markets and Private Democracy? The Renegotiation of Public and Private in Global
Politics, in DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 81
(Magdalena Bexell & Ulrika Mörth eds., 2010) (discussing the blurred distinction between
public and private actors and tasks in P3s).
46. See Mark Clayton, BP Oil Spill: MMS Shortcomings Include ‘Dearth of
SCI.
MONITOR
(June
17,
2010),
Regulations,’
CHRISTIAN
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2010/0617/BP-oil-spill-MMS-shortcomingsinclude-dearth-of-regulations.
47. See Kevin Spear, Documents Show BP Chose a Less-Expensive, Less-Reliable
Method for Completing Well in Gulf Oil Spill, ORLANDO SENTINEL (May 23, 2010),
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2010-05-23/news/os-florida-oil-spill-unspoken-risks20100522_1_oil-company-bp-rig-oil-spill.
48. See Clayton, supra note 46; see also ‘Shared Failure’ in BP Spill Cited in Panel
Report, supra note 23.
49. See LOXLEY WITH LOXLEY, supra note 33, at 3 (“The desirability and effectiveness
of any P3, from the point of view of the various actors, is directly related to the specific
content of the contract, the way it is implemented and the vision behind it.”). This statement
of course assumes that BP and the MMS were economically rational actors at the time the
lease originated.
50. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION
THROUGH LAW REFORM 89 (2004). Congressman Issa requested information on behalf of the
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, but was denied access to
communications between the Interior Department and private sector entities. See Letter from
Darrell Issa, U.S. Rep. for Cal., to Kenneth Salazar, Sec’y Interior (May 3, 2010), available
at http://www.boemre.gov/deepwaterreadingroom/; Letter to Darrell Issa, U.S. Rep. for Cal.
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engendered by broad FOIA protection, parties usually conduct P3 contract
negotiations without public participation,51 often antithetical to public welfare
interests,52 and subcontracted to multiple parties outside the host country.53 The
implications of extraction P3s for the host country’s environment, labor sector,
taxpayers, and business climate are far reaching, though the process of negotiating
such arrangements is generally designed to exclude these interests,54 thus
substituting contracts negotiated behind closed doors for public policy referenda.55
The host country’s public welfare aims are further jeopardized by the tendency of
savvy transnational contractors to take advantage of inherent economic and
jurisdictional limitations by subcontracting riskier aspects of projects to other
transnationals.56
Private partners also bear substantial risks in transnational P3s. When extraction
contracts are inadequate for unforeseen real-world developments, state actors
engaged in P3s may seek to renegotiate contracts—changing the terms to reassign
downside risk away from the public partner and its constituents.57 Renegotiation in
this instance can be thought of as the sword wielded when the shield fails. The Act
clearly demonstrates the dangers renegotiation poses to the private P3 party.
Through the 2011 Act,58 the U.S. government seeks unlimited liability in order to
recover from its P3 partner in excess of the original terms—the $75 million liability
cap under the OPA which BP’s insurer, Jupiter Insurance, Ltd., ostensibly relied
upon at the time BP negotiated its lease.59 As an ad hoc remedy in extraction
industry P3s, renegotiation is recognized as a necessary evil despite its adverse

from Christopher P. Salotti, Legislative Counsel, Office of Cong. and Legislative Affairs
(July 21, 2010), available at http://www.boemre.gov/deepwaterreadingroom/.
51. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 176 (“P3 planners typically oppose efforts at
deliberative participatory decision-making.”).
52. Id. at 180 (noting that participatory planning by non-parties is seen as a financial
risk to be mitigated).
53. See AMAN, supra note 50, at 197.
54. See, e.g., B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre, Public-Private Partnerships and the
Democratic Deficit: Is Performance-Based Legitimacy the Answer?, in DEMOCRACY AND
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 45, at 41, 46 (“[T]he
operative efficiency of partnerships hinges to some extent on seclusion from public
debate.”).
55. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 180–81.
56. See Kahn, supra note 10 (noting that arbitration is the only legal option for BP to
collect from its partners).
57. See supra note 39.
58. Big Oil Bailout Prevention Liability Act of 2011, H.R. 492, 112th Cong. (2011).
59. See Michael Cessna, Insurance Implications of the Deepwater Horizon Disaster,
LEXISNEXIS.COM (May 17, 2010, 1:43 PM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/
insurancelaw/blogs/insurancelawblog/archive/2010/05/17/insurance-implications-of-thedeepwater-horizon-disaster-by-michael-cessna-of-counsel-lathrop-amp-gage-llp.aspx (noting
the liability limits of the insurance underwriter). As Cessna notes, the liability requirements
in place at the time of negotiation were fixed by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which was
itself a response to the disastrous Valdez spill in Prince William Sound. See id. The
government’s punitive damages recovery was limited by the United States Supreme Court
after MMS’s March 2008 lease with BP was entered into. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,
554 U.S. 471 (2008).
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effects on business.60 The amount the government seeks to recover from BP will
likely exceed $50 billion,61 though potential sanctions under the Clean Water Act,
private securities actions, and negligence suits may well double BP’s costs.62 Other
estimates put the number as high as $100 billion after cleanup and litigation costs
are taken into account.63 BP is in turn seeking to recover from its investors,64
though BP does not have as much negotiation leverage as the U.S. government
does through its sovereign powers.
As long as P3s have existed, renegotiation has existed.65 Renegotiation
essentially imposes new, unfavorable contract terms on the private partner that is
otherwise powerless to continue its business without accepting the renegotiated
terms. Large transnationals are especially vulnerable to renegotiation given their
structural lack of political representation in the host country, the potential for
adverse public sentiment toward foreign entities,66 and the typically large
investment and liability exposure associated with the massive infrastructure
projects in which they are most likely to participate.67 Because the proposed Act
would apply retroactively, it is a form of unilateral renegotiation of the contract
terms by the United States.68 While electoral politics compel the host country in a
transnational P3 to shift the economic burden from their constituent taxpayers to
the transnational operators after a disaster such as the Spill,69 relying on
renegotiation as a viable alternative to adequate negotiation at the P3’s formation

60. See YINKA OMOROGBE, THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY: EXPLORATION AND
PRODUCTION CONTRACTS 5 (1997) (acknowledging renegotiation as a function of inevitable
changes).
61. Tom Bergin, How BP’s Gulf Oil Disaster Costs Could Double, INS. J. (Dec. 1,
2010), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2010/12/01/115279.htm (showing
that total costs of the BP disaster are being adjusted continuously upward, and are presently
estimated to be around $50 billion).
62. Id.
63. See Daniel Bates, ‘The Most Incompetent CEO in Living Memory’: BP Chief Tony
Hayward Demoted After Public Flogging as Clean-up Cost Could Reach $70bn, MAIL
ONLINE (June 19, 2010, 9:37 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1287685/BPoil-spill-Shares-rise-Louisiana-puts-cost-100billion.html.
64. Schwartz, supra note 11.
65. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 287–88 (discussing renegotiation as a measure
typically undertaken by governments); see also id. at 292 (“In fact, efforts to renegotiate
projects result in revision of material contract terms.”).
66. See After Dubai Ports World, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/03/AR2007030301029.
html.
67. See Cessna, supra note 59 (noting some of the larger P3 arrangements undertaken
and that BP’s insurer is capable of underwriting up to $700 million of liability insurance).
68. LOXLEY WITH LOXLEY, supra note 33, at 3 (“[Q]uestions arise about . . . who is
bearing the costs of these arrangements. It is at that point that P3s potentially become
controversial, as not everyone involved may be a winner, and then the details of any
arrangement become crucial.”).
69. Id. at 176–77 (“Indeed, without evidence of risk transfer, there is, in general, no case
for the P3 approach.”).
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reduces or eliminates the economic benefits of vital P3 arrangements and increases
the ultimate costs to both sides of P3s.70
Clearly accidents will happen regardless of how well-negotiated future contracts
are; however, renegotiation is a symptom of a failed process as well as a predicate
to indirect future costs. If existing regulatory and negotiation structures in P3
arrangements are not reformed, increasing direct and indirect costs may jeopardize
the efficacy of transnational P3s.71 The Act seeks to resolve the question of who
should pay for the cleanup of the Gulf, but it raises the issue of what mechanisms
can prospectively eliminate the need for such measures by aligning business and
public welfare aims with the government’s goal of reducing costs through P3
arrangements.72
II. REGULATORY MODELS IN TRANSNATIONAL CONTEXTS
The administrative environment in which the parties operate is an important
consideration when examining P3 contracts. It stands to reason that weak
regulatory regimes would prefer to rely upon highly-negotiated contract terms (or
renegotiation) to ensure the private party is held liable for risk or harm to the host
country’s interests. Unfortunately, such contracts are expensive to negotiate and
invariably fail to address at least some material concerns.73 On the other hand,
strongly enforced regulations effectively incorporate a wide range of statutory and
administrative laws into the contract, necessitating significant expenditures in the
form of oversight and enforcement.74 BP’s disregard of public regulations without
consequence indicates poor enforcement,75 whereas the necessity of ex post
renegotiation indicates lack of adequate bargaining during the negotiation phase.76
In looking to improve the balance between contract and administrative law, the
nature of regulation itself is in question: what should it look like? Professor Aman
identifies three models of administrative regulation: market-based regulation,
strong regulatory state, and efficient-state regulation.77
A. The Ideological Methods: Market-Based and Strong Regulatory State Models
In many ways, these two models mimic “traditional political debates between
conservatives and liberals, at least regarding issues within U.S. borders.”78 Each

70. Id. at 3 (“[P3s] might . . . impose costs on taxpayers that may not always be
evident.”).
71. See LIKOSKY, supra note 33, at 31–42 (discussing the historical development of P3s
and their present necessity).
72. See LOXLEY WITH LOXLEY, supra note 33, at 176 (“The apparent motivation behind
the approach [of creating P3s] has shifted to some degree from an attempt to move
infrastructure spending and debt off the government books . . . .”).
73. See OMOROGBE, supra note 60, at 122.
74. See AMAN, supra note 50, at 97–98.
75. See Clayton, supra note 46.
76. See OMOROGBE, supra note 60, at 5–6.
77. See generally AMAN, supra note 50, at 118–24.
78. Id. at 119.
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model is a relic of an earlier paradigm and not particularly well suited to the global
marketplace.79
Market-based regulation treats contracts as the superior form of governance and
propounds two goals: maximum autonomy for the contracting parties and minimal
government intervention or oversight.80 While reducing the burden of regulation is
a legitimate aim of both private and public parties,81 the danger of market-based
regulation is that it is inherently incapable of recognizing a public interest beyond
what the market itself may provide.82 In a market-based regulatory scheme
involving transnational P3s, the government delegates its public-welfare duty and
provides the foreign entity incentive to skirt regulations inasmuch as the
cost-benefit balance compels it to do so.83 The danger of allowing transnational,
private corporations organized outside the United States to determine the degree to
which they should uphold the government’s aims should be self-evident.
Market-based regulation is not without merit in some instances; public bodies may
sanction non-self-enforcing private regulations for the sake of convenience and
efficiency.84 But even in smaller industries where some degree of private
self-policing has proven effective, public regulation is almost always a necessary
backstop to voluntary self-regulation.85 As a practical matter, it is very difficult to
imagine a set of effective, voluntary measures BP would have been more likely to
follow than the public regulations it ignored at the peril of its workers and the
environment.86 As noted in the context of the 2008 financial collapse, “voluntary
regulation does not work.”87

79. See id. at 117 (noting that both methods “clearly resonate with long-standing
political assumptions and public-law theories”).
80. See id. at 120; see also Karin Svedberg Helgesson, Partnerships, Boundary
Blurring, and Accountable Actorhood, in DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 45, at 24, 24 (noting that under a market regulation
scheme, “the business sector is expected to help produce frameworks for governing itself by
creating industry standards, codes of conduct, and other rules as a complement to, or even
substitute for, intra- and interstate regulation”).
81. See supra text accompanying note 36. The purpose of P3s is to reduce costs and
create profits. Costs imposed by government regulation necessarily hamper both.
82. Peters and Pierre pithily note that market-based regulation creates a “private-private
partnership.” Peters & Pierre, supra note 54, at 42–43.
83. AMAN, supra note 50, at 119.
84. See supra text accompanying note 81.
85. See Mark Levinson, Wishful Thinking, in ARCHON FUNG, DARA O’ROURKE &
CHARLES SABEL, CAN WE PUT AN END TO SWEATSHOPS? 54 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers
eds., 2001) (critiquing the optimism of an article which claims viable private or
self-regulating measures are possible absent government enforcement).
86. See, e.g., Dina Cappiello, Another Report Says BP Ignored Warning Signs on
Doomed Deepwater Horizon Well, AL.COM (Nov. 17, 2010, 9:59 AM),
http://blog.al.com/wire/2010/11/report_bp_ignored_warnings.html (noting that in the months
leading up to the disaster, BP recklessly disregarded a multitude of regulations, norms, and
warnings).
87. STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS AT WAR: SHOTGUN TAKEOVERS, GOVERNMENT BY
DEAL, AND THE PRIVATE EQUITY IMPLOSION 159 (2009) (citing former SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox remarking upon the failure of market-based, voluntary regulation in
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Expansive bureaucracies regulating even privatized and global industries typify
the strong regulatory state model.88 As evidenced by circumstances surrounding the
BP spill, an expansive regulatory regime may result in costly, redundant oversight
functions and an overgrown bureaucracy that compromises the effectiveness of the
administrative system as a whole.89 As studies and reports concerning the BP
disaster have surfaced, the degree to which regulations were in place but
unenforced has become clear.90 The inspector general’s office found that MMS
regulators were “heavily reliant on industry to document and accurately report on
operations, production, and royalties.”91 The administrative bureaucracy overseeing
BP metastasized to the point that even the various agencies tasked with oversight
were not sure of their responsibilities.92 While overseeing BP’s operations, MMS
regulators failed to review data submissions by the operators regarding deepwater
drilling,93 seek sufficient information prior to approving drill permit applications,94
specify well design and materials requirements,95 require tests for the prevention
system implicated in the disaster,96 or notice obvious clerical and mathematical
errors on BP documents.97 In addition, the investigating commission found that
MMS regulators had violated ethical rules and disregarded safety guidelines.98 As
the facts surrounding the Spill indicate, having numerous agencies tasked with
oversight does not ensure effective oversight,99 especially where overlap creates
confusion regarding each agency’s responsibilities.100
Balancing operational efficiency for private parties and effective regulation by
public parties demands rethinking existing administrative structures. A cornerstone
of such a reform is eliminating incentives that tend to result in captured regulators
and opaque governance agencies in which ineffectual oversight is hidden from
public view until disaster strikes.101 The “major implication of this broader
preventing the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers).
88. AMAN, supra note 50, at 120 (“To strong regulatory state advocates, the public
sphere, particularly when it comes to the economic and environmental well-being of
individuals should be a broad one . . . .”).
89. See, e.g., Deepwater Horizon Spill Report Blames BP, Contractors, Government,
ENVTL. NEWS SERV. (Nov. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Deepwater], http://www.ensnewswire.com/ens/nov2010/2010-11-17-01.html (describing confusion among agencies
tasked with regulating the oil drilling industry).
90. See, e.g., id.
91. Clayton, supra note 46 (quoting Mary Kendall, Acting Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Interior).
92. See Laura Strickler, BP Rig Missed 16 Inspections Before Explosion, CBS NEWS
(June 11, 2010, 5:39 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-31727_162-2000751410391695.html.
93. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, CHIEF COUNSEL’S REPORT 253 (2011).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 254.
96. Id. at 256 (noting “the lack of any regulation requiring negative pressure tests”).
97. Id. at 259.
98. Id. at 261.
99. See Eilperin, supra note 17.
100. See Strickler, supra note 92.
101. See, e.g., Peters & Pierre, supra note 54, at 46–47 (discussing the detrimental effects
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reconfiguration seems to lie in a renegotiation of what is or should be governed by
market competition, what is or should be governed by democratic procedures, and
how these two mechanisms (should) interrelate.”102
B. The Pragmatic Method: The Efficient-State Regulation Model
Reforming the regulatory system challenges lawmakers to find “a balance
between the use of official standards bodies and market forces to set standards.”103
The efficient-state regulatory model borrows from principles of modern corporate
governance’s emphasis on streamlining and internal cooperation,104 as well as the
focus on public welfare interests and effective oversight that are hallmarks of
strong regulatory states.105 As the name suggests, the model emphasizes efficient,
as opposed to expansive, regulation.106 The strengths of this model are its task
rather than process orientation, and its fluidity rather than parochialism.107 The
primary drawbacks of this model are the potential for increased front-end costs, as
well as structural and procedural obstacles to implementing such a system.108
The efficient-state regulatory model emphasizes transparency, accountability,
and efficiency. Effectively implementing an efficient-state model encourages input
from a broad range of interests in order to best assign the numerous responsibilities
inherent in complex transactions.109 Under an efficient-state model, BP and the
MMS would negotiate a lease with input from subcontractors, independent
scientists and engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency, labor unions,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and foreseeably affected industries such
as fisheries, coastal businesses, and oil refineries, among others. By including a
greater cross-section of interested parties, the front-end negotiations will greatly
improve the assignment of responsibilities and liabilities, ultimately reducing the
need for back-end regulatory measures and contract litigation or renegotiation.
An expanded roster of contract participants further increases transparency.110 In
practice if not by design, the current regulatory model keeps citizens uninformed111
and is largely unable to prevent self-interested technocrats and managers, whose
to public welfare interests engendered by opaque governance structures); see also LIKOSKY,
supra note 33, at 25 (“What is worrisome is when mixing is obscured from public view.”).
102. Dingwerth & Hanreider, supra note 45, at 97.
103. Peter Grindley, Regulation and Standards Policy: Setting Standards by Committees
and Markets, in THE REGULATORY CHALLENGE 210 (Matthew Bishop, John Kay & Colin
Mayer eds., 1995).
104. See AMAN, supra note 50, at 121–22.
105. See id. at 120 (“To strong regulatory state advocates, the public sphere, particularly
when it comes to the economic and environmental well-being of individuals should be a
broad one . . . .”).
106. See id.at 121.
107. See id.
108. See infra Part IV.B.
109. See id.at 141–44 (stating that the inclusion of non-participants is the best way to
ensure representation of public welfare interests, as well as to sufficiently develop and assign
contract liabilities during the negotiation process).
110. See id. at 143–44.
111. See AMAN, supra note 50, at 141 (“Openness, accountability, and citizen
participation are vital to new governance regimes now emerging.”).
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interests are often aligned against transparency, from dictating the deal’s terms in
derogation of the public welfare interests or third parties’ economic concerns.112
The present regulatory model often operates to reduce or eliminate the influence of
public-interest actors even though public money is being spent to oversee the
projects.113 Within P3s, opaqueness tends to benefit the private parties, who
negotiate self-interestedly before complaints can be registered, depend on the
rational apathy or ignorance of the public, and “firefight” the problem with the
most cost-effective measures if necessary.114 This paradigm is reflected the
circumstances leading up to the Deepwater Horizon disaster.115 The lifting of the
moratorium on deepwater drilling not long before the Spill, over strenuous protests
by NGOs, raises a suspicion that the government failed to adequately weigh the
public interests at stake.116 Governance of P3s with the potential to cause so much
damage to the public should necessitate greater participation by public-interest
advocates.117 Given the high financial stakes at play in large transnational P3s,118
economic rather than public welfare consideration may be overemphasized in
negotiating and regulating P3 arrangements.119 However, the Act demonstrates
public welfare costs are both monetizable and substantial,120 and should therefore
not be ignored.
Aside from implicating democratic ideals,121 the government’s failure to
represent the public interest overlooks potentially serious consequences, as
evidenced by the lives lost aboard the Deepwater Horizon and the negative
commercial impact of the Spill.122

112. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 176 (“P3 planners typically oppose efforts at
deliberative participatory decision-making.”); see also id. at 182 (noting that citizens are not
partners, their interests are a cost to be mitigated).
113. See id.; see also AMAN, supra note 50, at 144 (noting that once the bargaining enters
the administrative agency phase, bargaining with NGOs and public interest groups is
limited).
114. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 180–83.
115. See Deepwater, supra note 89.
116. See Shannon, supra note 41 (discussing how energy policy concerns led to the
decision to lift the deepwater drilling ban, over protests from NGOs); see also Eilperin,
supra note 17 (noting that the government granted BP a categorical exclusion from
submitting an environmental impact analysis only eleven days prior to explosion).
117. See Peters & Pierre, supra note 54, at 52 (“[G]overnance of [P3s] has to be
embedded in public values and must serve under sufficient political control to meet minimal
requirements of transparency.”).
118. See Hahn, supra note 42 (noting the United States collected $6.5 billion in royalties
from extraction leases in 2009).
119. See AMAN, supra note 50, at 144 (“[E]conomic discourse . . . increasingly dominates
regulation . . . .”).
120. In this instance, the costs to BP may exceed eight to sixteen times the total amount
of extraction lease royalties the United States received in 2009. See supra text accompanying
notes 60–63.
121. See STEETS, supra note 44, at 48 (“[W]herever power is exercised there should be
mechanisms of accountability . . . .” (citations omitted)).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 4 and 61–63.
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While transparency primarily involves the public side of a P3, accountability
should be of primary concern to both sides123—public negotiators depend upon
reelection for their positions of power and the private negotiators have come to
recognize the necessity of positive public relations.124 As noted generally in
transnational contexts, “accountability is largely driven by public interest
groups,”125 and in the absence of accountability mechanisms, P3s are prone to
abuse or corruption.126 A poignant example of moral hazard in an environment of
minimal accountability is the MMS’s exemption of BP from an environmental
impact study over NGO objections and based only on BP’s self-serving report to
the MMS.127
Effective accountability mechanisms require clear internal rules and predictable
oversight.128 Participation by a wider range of parties should increase
accountability and benefit all parties through better-defined responsibilities and
oversight roles. Clear standards and rules reduce the likelihood of costly litigation
and enforcement proceedings; predictability and stability entice other private
parties to form P3s with the host country; and predictability should operate to
reduce insurance costs as risks are better defined.129 The Act seeks to impose an
unpredictable standard of liability. The moratorium paralyzes business to the
detriment of both P3 parties and the consumers. The Spill cost BP billions of
dollars, and litigation will only increase the expenses. The costs to the United
States are undetermined. The quantifiable costs from unpredictable accountability
standards are massive and likely still growing.130 More effective accountability
mechanisms may well have prevented an extremely costly accident in this
instance,131 and could prevent future disasters.
Efficiency likewise concerns both business and government entities, to the
extent it often predominates transparency and accountability concerns.132 BP’s
costs from the Spill are in the tens of billions of dollars; the cost of enhanced
oversight and negotiation could hardly reach this level. A public law system that is
both effective and efficient benefits P3s and justifies the market-based regulatory

123. LIKOSKY, supra note 33, at 25 (“As a matter of policy, if a government promotes
certain corporate groups, then the government should be accountable for the actions of such
groups.”).
124. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: ESSAYS
ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 94 (1972) (noting that businesses’ acceptance of
corporate social responsibility norms are so entrenched as to be beyond debate).
125. LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 176.
126. Id. at 163.
127. See Eilperin, supra note 17.
128. See STEETS, supra note 44, at 105–06.
129. This benefit is most applicable to smaller transnationals as BP’s subsidiary
underwriter, Jupiter Insurance, Ltd., will not underwrite liability in excess of $700 million,
well below BP’s estimated liability in this instance. See Cessna, supra note 59.
130. See supra note 120.
131. See generally NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND
OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra note 93, at 225–61 (detailing the many ways in which the Spill
might have been prevented and implicating a lack of accountability as a primary cause of the
accident).
132. See supra note 119.
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measures adopted by some agencies.133 Devising a fluid system subject to
government control is the best means of ensuring efficient and effective
regulation.134 However, third-party participation at the planning stages and high
standards of accountability should be part of the system for it to remain effective in
the long term.135 Effective, as opposed to expansive, oversight is necessarily better
equipped to avoid financial and environmental disasters and associated government
costs than are voluntary measures or labyrinthine regulatory structures. The
challenge is in adopting structural changes that encourage efficient oversight and
safeguard against inefficiencies and entrenched special interests in the regulatory
process.
In light of the incentives and realities of global business and public welfare, an
efficient-state system is the most realistic means of increasing accountability and
transparency in P3s while maintaining efficiency. The three goals of efficient-state
model are interrelated. Increased accountability encourages transparency and
reduces the costs associated with uncertainty and instability. Increased transparency
creates opportunities to bargain for public welfare136 and thereby reduce oversight
costs through greater contractual participation and accountability assignment.
III. THE EFFICIENT-STATE SOLUTION
In negotiating a P3 arrangement, the government assumes both public welfare
aims and private contract party responsibilities.137 Risk taking is implicit in P3
arrangements generally, and extraction industry arrangements in particular, so a
significant function of the negotiation phase is to equitably assign risk among the
parties while protecting each party’s broader interests.138 The private side seeks to

133. See AMAN, supra note 50, at 141–43 (noting methods the Administrative Procedure
Act uses to set standards rather than rules).
134. See Peters & Pierre, supra note 54, at 52–53 (“For such [transnational] partnerships
to become useful instruments, they have to cater to public and collective objectives. This
requires some degree of external control . . . .”).
135. See, e.g., Cappiello, supra note 86 (noting that in the months leading up to the
disaster, BP recklessly disregarded a multitude of regulations, norms, and warnings).
136. See STEETS, supra note 44, at 48 (“‘[A]dequate governance mechanisms [...] must be
more inclusive and participatory—that is, more democratic—than in the past.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting COMM’N ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD: THE
REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (1995))); see also id. at 47–48 (discussing
the democracy deficit in transnational P3s).
137. See LIKOSKY, supra note 33, at 23–24.
138. The efficacy of risk transfer is debated, however. Compare LOXLEY WITH LOXLEY,
supra note 33, at 176 (“The empirical case for cost reduction and risk transfer, however, has
not been established, and some suggest that ‘In infrastructure projects, it rarely makes sense
to try to transfer large amounts of risk to the private sector.’” (citation omitted)), with
STEETS, supra note 44, at 40 (“Trust reduces transaction costs and thereby enables
institutions to work more efficiently.” (footnote omitted)). If risk transfer is indeed an
exercise in futility, it makes the public welfare negotiation even more important as the
financial risks cannot be sufficiently assigned or even estimated. See LOXLEY WITH LOXLEY,
supra note 33, at 175 (“Transaction costs of the P3 route are often not accurately or fully
recorded.”).
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reduce the risk it absorbs and insure against the risk it undertakes; the public side
seeks to minimize its risk exposure and inure benefits to its constituency.139 As with
all negotiations, a fundamental concern is reducing the overall transaction costs
relative to the benefits inuring under the contract. Assigning risk and evaluating
transaction costs within the P3 context implicate the same concerns as the
efficient-state model: how to best assign risk in light of transparency,
accountability, efficiency, and public welfare concerns.
A. Transparency, Accountability, Public Welfare, and Efficiency
Bäckstrand notes that bringing third parties to the table encourages greater
consideration of risks inherent in nonpublic arrangements,140 overcoming the
perception that “[d]eliberative processes [in P3s] tend to be cosmetic and symbolic,
and are often added on or serve to legitimize decisions already made.”141
Transparency in the negotiation process assures greater representation of interests
than will occur in closed negotiations between the government and special
interests, or “peak organizations.”142 Narrowing the interests represented in the
negotiation phase is more apt to produce a final contract in which the parties regard
public welfare interests as externalities.143 Conversely, a contract that assigns the
widest possible range of duties and responsibilities should reduce the overall cost
of administration and enforcement.144
The government’s responsibility to safeguard the public welfare should inform
the negotiation process.145 If the government does not adequately bargain for public
welfare, the contract terms will not likely ensure such aims are met, especially
given the practical and procedural problems of indemnified or inadequately insured
transnational subcontractors.146 Furthermore, where the government fails to

139. See LOXLEY WITH LOXLEY, supra note 33, at 176 (“The apparent motivation behind
the approach [of creating P3s] has shifted to some degree from an attempt to move
infrastructure spending and debt off the government books, to a desire to reduce costs
through transferring risk to the private sector.”).
140. See, e.g., Karin Bäckstrand, From Rhetoric to Practice: The Legitimacy of Global
Public-Private Partnerships for Sustainable Development, in DEMOCRACY AND
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 45, at 145 (examining
the effects of greater stakeholder participation on transparency and accountability in the
CDM and Johannesburg partnerships).
141. Id. at 159.
142. AMAN, supra note 50, at 143.
143. See, e.g., LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 170 (“[O]ur domestic economy sees aspects of
the public interest as risks to be mitigated. By reformulating public interest concerns as risks
to project profitability, financial institutions in effect domesticate the common good.”).
144. See id. at 191.
145. See, e.g., AMAN, supra note 50, at 143 (“[T]he state . . . seeks to assert its view of
the public interest in the course of bargaining.”).
146. See David Phillips, It Lost an Oil Rig, but Transocean May Easily Ride Out the Gulf
Oil Spill, BNET (May 13, 2010), http://www.bnet.com/blog/sec-filings/it-lost-an-oil-rig-buttransocean-may-easily-ride-out-the-gulf-oil-spill/360?tag=content (describing Transocean’s
insurance and indemnification against losses); see also Kahn, supra note 10 (describing the
difficulty BP had in recovering from its subcontractors).
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negotiate public welfare aims, it creates a moral hazard in the private entity; BP
received little warning that its numerous violations would impel government
sanctions.147 Reducing the private party’s moral hazard at the negotiation stage is a
government’s public welfare responsibility.148
Government should adopt a more risk-averse posture in negotiation and a more
aggressive compliance-enforcement posture. Risk aversion by the government will
incentivize greater negotiation by both parties to efficiently spread costs to insurers
and seek input from NGOs and other interested parties to better understand those
costs. On the downside, including a wider range of participants could raise costs of
bidding, planning, and negotiating,149 although there is at least some debate as to
whether these costs are permanent.150 From a short-term transaction cost
perspective, the administrative issues of bringing more parties to the table are a
disincentive, as is the willingness of P3s to undertake additional public
responsibilities as part of the contract.151 Requiring BP to negotiate on a wider
range of issues and with more parties would give contract signatories enforcement
power through the agreement’s terms, while creating strong incentives for BP to
insure against its losses at the outset. Though BP could always disregard
regulations at its own peril, expanding the roster of participants in the negotiation
and embedding them in the oversight mechanism would enable policing by
interested parties and thus reduce enforcement costs.
B. Renegotiation and Its Costs
After a disaster like the Spill, the government is likely to impose harsh measures
such as an industry-chilling moratorium on drilling152 or renegotiation as in the
form of the Act.153 The effects of the moratorium and renegotiation on business,
policy, and consumer interests are likely to have far-reaching indirect effects,
destabilizing investment and increasing regulation costs.154

147. See Strickler, supra note 92 (noting BP’s repeated failure to meet inspection
requirements without significant adverse consequences).
148. MCAFEE & MCMILLAN, supra note 36, at 17 (“Moral hazard, like risk aversion, is an
element that the government agency must consider in designing the optimal contract.”); see
also Boddewyn, supra note 39, at 196 (“Ongoing operations, on the other hand, require a
type of government relations focusing on the integration of the guest company in to the host
economy and society through the obeying of laws . . . .”).
149. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 170 (“[P]articipatory planning is reformulated as a
financial risk to the interest of planners, a risk that must be mitigated at the least possible
cost to the project’s commercial interests.”).
150. See STEETS, supra note 44, at 40 (“Trust reduces transaction costs and thereby
enables institutions to work more efficiently.” (footnote omitted)).
151. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 170.
152. A seven-year moratorium was imposed on deepwater drilling, which is almost
certain to stifle oil exploration and American energy policy for its duration. See John M.
Broder & Clifford Krauss, U.S. Drops Bid to Explore Oil in Eastern Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
2, 2010, at A1.
153. See supra text accompanying note 68.
154. See Brooks, supra note 38 (discussing the likely harmful effects to the oil industry in
light of government actions taken in response to the Gulf Oil Spill).
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Renegotiation portends many hidden costs that ultimately harm the public as
well as the private industries.155 Renegotiation is likely to impose oppressive terms
on the private partner as the public side renegotiates only when it recognizes a
deficiency in its perceived benefits under the contract.156 In the present instance,
U.S. taxpayers have funded the cleanup and seek to recover from BP. As
undesirable as the outcome that taxpayers foot the bill for BP’s negligence is, the
prospective costs to taxpayers of renegotiation are likewise substantial, if indirect.
There is a fierce competition for transnational partnerships in the extraction sector,
and private parties will disfavor contracting with a country that negotiates for
oppressive terms, leaving the host country’s core industries underdeveloped.157
Renegotiation’s unpredictable nature increases the political risk of the country
that utilizes it. The more political risk—or likelihood of acting unpredictably
against the private party’s interests—a country holds, the less likely transnational
actors will invest in that country, depriving the country of revenue, infrastructure,
and access to cheaper resources.158 Transnational industries will look closely at
BP’s liability for the Spill, especially costs imposed by the Act. If the United States
punishes BP harshly, future partners in P3s will seek greater assurances in the
negotiation process in order to do business within the United States. Accordingly,
the United States could be forced to make more front-end concessions to remain a
competitive foreign investment destination, further eroding its bargaining position
vis-à-vis public welfare interests.159 Increasing the risk or cost of doing business in
the United States may dissuade transnational extraction companies from
contracting with United States altogether. Fewer P3s with transnationals will result
in more of those contracts going to domestic industries, which will likely increase
costs to the public side through greater overhead, insurance, and tax subsidy
costs.160 The ancillary effects of fewer transnational P3s will likely include higher
insurance costs, less market participation from smaller firms, and reduced overall
foreign investment in American infrastructure.161 In order to avoid negative
perceptions stemming from the Act, the United States would be well served to
decrease regulatory compliance costs and enhance P3 stability through an
efficient-state regulatory model. The rationale behind transnational P3s is to reduce
the host country’s development costs, but inadequate negotiation, poor regulation,
or renegotiation could inadvertently increase both the economic and external costs

155. See id.
156. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 333 (“Governments may take on too many downside
risks. . . . Many renegotiations are driven by [this] feature[] of partnerships.”).
157. See OMOROGBE, supra note 60, at 25.
158. See id. at 45; see also LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 311 (“[R]enegotiations may
decrease foreign appetite for investment . . . driving down efficiency and overall revenue
into the country.”).
159. See, e.g., OMOROGBE, supra note 60, at 18 (noting that environmental regulation in
the United States “greatly increases costs for the companies”). Increased costs to businesses
will predictably result in higher costs to consumers, the true public side of a P3. See id.
160. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 264.
161. See Brooks, supra note 38.
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of such arrangements past the point at which it is rational to form such
relationships.162
Inasmuch as the proposed Act is a renegotiation of BP’s liability at the lease’s
inception, and insofar as the effects of such a renegotiation are harmful to the oil
industry, consumers, and American taxpayers, the U.S. government should avoid
similar measures in the future. As a complement to efficient-state regulatory
measures, an effective way to avoid such costly measures is an enhanced contract
negotiation process that brings the responsibilities of the parties closer to
self-enforcing than they are under the existing regulatory model. Enhanced
accountability, transparency, and consideration of the public welfare ultimately
increase efficiency and serve to preclude measures such as the Act and the
moratorium, both of which are toxic to transnational investment in, and
development of, the United States’ vital industries.
IV. THE FUTURE OF REGULATION AND CONTRACT IN TRANSNATIONAL P3
CONTEXTS
The Act raises important questions regarding effective regulation and public
welfare. Retroactive measures, such as the Act and its predecessor the OPA, are
necessary and meaningful only in the wake of disasters, but such measures cannot
retroactively prevent or rectify disasters.163 BP can pay costs even in excess of $50
billion.164 However, smaller oil drilling companies are not so profitable and future
measures may not be possible with a less wealthy P3 partner.165 Recognizing that
some disasters will always be inevitable, liability may still be more cheaply and
effectively negotiated for ex ante by improving the contract bargaining process and
streamlining the administrative role—hallmarks of an efficient-state theory. Despite
the benefits of enhanced accountability, public welfare protection, transparency,
and efficiency, realizing an efficient-state regulatory system will not be possible
without overcoming entrenched perceptions and structural impediments to reform.

162. See supra text accompanying notes 33–36. As the formation of P3s is motivated by
economic incentives, excessive costs in creating or maintaining a P3 necessarily undermine
the rationale for such arrangements.
163. See generally Brad Marten, Brad Marten on Fighting the Last War: The Relevance
(and Irrelevance) of the Exxon Valdez Oil Tanker Spill to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig
Spill, LEXISNEXIS.COM (May 6, 2010, 7:37 PM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/
litigationresourcecenter/blogs/litigationblog/archive/2010/05/07/brad-marten-on-fightingthe-last-war-the-relevance-and-irrelevance-of-the-exxon-valdez-oil-tanker-spill-to-thedeepwater-horizon-oil-rig-spill.aspx.
164. See Bergin, supra note 61 (showing that total costs of the BP disaster are being
adjusted continuously upward, and are presently estimated to be around $50 billion).
165. See Nicholas Graham, BP’s Profits Far Outweigh the Cost of Cleaning Up Gulf Oil
Spill, HUFFINGTON POST (May 27, 2010, 1:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/05/27/bps-profits-far-outweigh_n_591992.html.
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A. Perception Obstacles
The Act raises questions about how to create more effective regulatory
processes so that measures like the Act are not required again.166 The U.S.
government’s fumbled response to the Spill is an indictment of the present
regulatory model’s limitations.167 Reforming the regulatory paradigm and moving
from the inertia of the present regulatory system to that of an efficient-state system
requires more than mere persuasion; it requires the will to transform perceptions of
American regulation, not only domestically but also abroad.
1. Transnational Perceptions
The Act increases political risk by raising the possibility that retrospective
increases in liability limits will become the paradigm of future regulation.168 The
United States is presently a prime destination for P3s in large part for its perceived
willingness to underwrite risk to the benefit of the private parties.169 The Act’s loss
reassignment to BP may be politically defensible, but such ex post measures are
capricious considering the government is not without blame for the disaster.170 The
United States’s increase in BP’s liability limits cannot inspire confidence in other
transnationals bidding for extraction leases.
In crafting better-defined public welfare responsibilities within P3s, front-end
participation of public interests and NGOs is desirable, not a cost to be avoided.171
The irony of risk allocation in transnational P3s is that most of the transnationals
active in extraction industries are from well-developed countries that have public
welfare aims strongly entrenched in their native business climate.172 In its
hidebound insistence on mitigating nonmarket costs173 the U.S. government
overlooks the possibility that foreign operators are not so hostile to costs associated
with safeguarding the public welfare. It is not unthinkable that the U.S. government
could bargain for greater public benefits in P3s without completely overwhelming
the incentives presently inherent in the U.S. business climate. Rather than
renegotiate ex post, the United States is in a prime position to bargain ex ante with

166. See Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 39, at 378 (“[V]ery little attention is paid to
the design of the institutional processes surrounding public/private sector infrastructure
partnerships or the complex contracting problems that they present.”).
167. See Tim Dickinson, The Spill, the Scandal, and the President, ROLLING STONE, June
24, 2010, at 54.
168. See OMOROGBE, supra note 60, at 45.
169. LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 184–85.
170. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, supra note 93, at 253–61; ‘Shared Failure’ in BP Spill Cited in Panel Report,
supra note 23.
171. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 176 (“[A]ccountability is largely driven by public
interest groups.”).
172. Transocean (Switzerland), Ensco (U.K.), and Seadrill (Norway) are among the
largest drilling companies in the world and are based in countries with traditionally strong
regulatory systems. See e.g., INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON ECONOMIC REGULATION
(Michael Crew & David Parker eds., 2006).
173. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 182.
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transnationals to more effectively assign liability while better protecting American
public policy concerns.
2. Domestic Perceptions
Domestic perceptions of regulatory reform will depend largely on the scope of
reform adopted. On the unlikely end of the scale is the American government
opting to turn P3s into publicly held corporations as in the European model, rather
than creating extraction leases subject to administrative oversight as it presently
does.174 Adopting the European model would make the P3 a government operation,
ostensibly creating avenues for greater transparency and concomitantly reducing
the need for secrecy.175 Furthermore, the government could appoint watchdog
directors from outside industries such as NGOs and labor unions to reduce its
administrative costs. A likely insurmountable obstacle to such reform is
legitimizing such a socialized structure in the American business environment.176
The most likely result will be business as usual, with both sides hoping disaster
will not befall them and relying on renegotiation and litigation if it does. But the
tremendous public welfare and financial costs associated with this paradigm make
it undesirable. The most formidable obstacle to implementing efficient-state
regulatory measures is not a cost assessment, but the political reality of the present
system: most politicians in a competitively democratic system crave the chance to
make headlines, not to work behind the scenes. A well-publicized act by Congress
may garner more votes than a quiet, effective one that averts disasters like the Spill.
Furthermore, efficient measures offer fewer justifications for taxes and spending,
while any reduction in the bureaucratic state means entrenched interests must first
be defeated.
The predominant approach for a government aided by the possibility of
renegotiation is to approach initial negotiations as a win-win situation.177 As the
Act demonstrates, the U.S. government may anticipate gaining from the contract as
written or rely upon a later renegotiation to the detriment of investors, third parties,
and its P3 partners. Since the government is capable of controlling the
administrative information disseminated to the public and could thus refuse to
disclose facts surrounding its negotiations, few incentives are in place to encourage
the government to approach P3 negotiations with the care a truly private party
would.178
To sustain P3 arrangements and the public welfare interests of its citizens, the
U.S. government must shift its fundamental assumptions in negotiating P3s. Rather
than engage in its own form of firefighting, or ad hoc damage control, the
government should bargain as a private party unable to rely upon unilateral
renegotiation as a viable alternative to due diligence. Though this simple shift in

174. See AMAN, supra note 50, at 87–88 (comparing the U.S. and European P3 models).
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 184 (“[T]he presentation of P3 accountability in the
U.S. context is a nonissue because of the win-win nature of the approach is a naive
projection of joviality on what must be hard-nosed bargaining.”).
178. See id. at 163–64 (discussing lack of transparency from the government in P3s).
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negotiation tactics would result in an immediate return, it is difficult to predict if it
would be sufficient in itself, and even its implementation would require
overcoming the structural tendency toward a neocorporatist179 negotiation
process.180
B. Structural Issues
A common shortcoming of P3 leases is their failure to anticipate conflict
resolution, the need for adaptation, or the true costs of renegotiation.181 Such
failures are contract issues that could be avoided through better agreement
structuring. Though many details of BP’s lease are unavailable to the public,
apparently neither the BP lease nor the statutory limitations on liability sufficiently
anticipated the scope of the Spill’s damage or the legal and financial costs of
recovery.182 Omorogbe notes that “[w]hat a fluctuating investment climate needs is
not contract revision whenever fundamental changes occur. Instead . . . the
fluctuating nature of the investment climate should be taken into account.”183
Omorogbe also suggests that “the right agreement for any HC [host country] is
first and foremost one that is capable of managing and supervising efficiently.”184
Incentives to cut costs through reduced safety expenditures and compliance are
likely highest where costs, risks, and uncertainty are highest—fixed-price contracts
for exploratory drilling. For example, the BP lease was in the form of a fixed-price
contract, more specifically, a royalty-bearing license.185 In fixed-price leases,
profits accruing to the private partner vary inversely with development costs.186
Since every additional dollar spent by BP on compliance, safety, or research is
subtracted from its bottom line, this form of contract strongly encourages cost
cutting. A typical production-sharing agreement187 likewise incents the explorer to
cut all possible costs in bringing oil to the surface.188 Participation agreements and
joint ventures can be desirable alternatives to concessionary contracts as they are
highly negotiated at each stage, rely largely on self-enforcing regulations, and
allow the host country greater control over the extraction process.189 The United
States should consider various forms of leases designed to ensure, in each case, that

179. Neocorporatism is a system or process in which the government bargains with a
select group of special interests and “peak organizations” with respect to public policy. See
AMAN, supra note 50, at 143–44.
180. See id.
181. OMOROGBE, supra note 60, at 5.
182. See Gloria Gonzales, BP Oil Spill Damages To Stretch Insurance Coverage,
OILPRICE.COM (Aug. 2, 2010, 3:51PM), http://oilprice.com/Environment/Oil-Spills/BP-OilSpill-Damages-to-Stretch-Insurance-Coverage.html.
183. OMOROGBE, supra note 60, at 5–6.
184. Id. at 70.
185. Hahn, supra note 42.
186. See MCAFEE & MCMILLAN, supra note 36, at 23.
187. See OMOROGBE, supra note 60, at 60–61.
188. Because companies in production-sharing agreements bear all the risk associated
with exploration, the companies have maximum incentive to minimize exploration costs. See
id.
189. Id. at 64–65.
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oversight “objectives are satisfied, adequate financial benefits are accruing to the
state, and the company is assured of an acceptable level of profits at all times.”190
Limited market-based regulation is also desirable provided the government
structurally implements sufficient oversight ex ante. Private, or market-based,
regulations require less input, draw from a narrow range of generally aligned
interests, can respond quickly to change, and encourage the private party to
participate in creating mutually beneficial standards for compliance.191 Because of
these advantages, both governments and private parties are likely to find such
private or nonlegal regulations more workable in complex projects involving
transnational actors, multiple subcontractors, a host of regulations from overlapping
industries, and a nexus of publicly traded companies whose stock prices are in
permanent flux.192 Purely public laws are potentially obstructive in such complex
arrangements, where participants attempt to minimize the effect of complicated
regulatory mechanisms while maximizing profits.193 The key to effective
market-based regulations is that they should not be a last resort in lieu of regulation
or intended to circumvent oversight; the parties should agree upon clear standards
and judiciously assign responsibility.194 For example, fixing contract terms through
extensive negotiation, aligning incentives through a joint-venture agreement for
extraction, assigning third-party interests to assist in enforcement, and tying
economic incentives to compliance can all be used in conjunction with
market-based regulations. Similar provisions in transnational P3 contracts will cost
less to implement and maintain than the status quo, while better safeguarding
American public welfare interests.
Integrating the benefits of private and public regulatory schemes is the principle
underlying the call for enhanced contract negotiation procedures and efficient-state
regulatory processes. To achieve these ends, public lawmakers can draw lessons
from the theories that gave rise to private regulations in the first instance: corporate
legal models, transnational legal pluralism, and notions of the government as a
fiduciary. In recognition of common underlying aims in calls for efficient-state
regulation, aspects from these models may enhance the operation of P3s and
preserve the public and private benefits contemplated by those arrangements.

190. Id. at 70.
191. See Helgesson, supra note 80, at 24 (noting that under a market regulation scheme,
the “business sector is expected to help produce frameworks for governing itself by creating
industry standards, codes of conduct, and other rules as a complement to, or even substitute
for, intra- and interstate regulation”). For discussion of private regulation and its
development, see generally Susan Strange, The Declining Authority of States, in THE
GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE
127 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2d ed. 2003).
192. For a discussion of private actors’ incentives to private or market-based regulations,
see Julia Steets & Laura Blattner, Partnership Accountability Need Not Be Democratic
Accountability, in DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE, supra note 45, at 55, 58–59.
193. Id.
194. See id.; see also AMAN, supra note 50, at 96 (praising the Environmental Protection
Agency’s model of delegation).
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1. Corporate Legal Models and Transnational Legal Pluralism
In response to globalization and the need for businesses to operate across many
jurisdictions simultaneously, many private actors and the entities that regulate them
have rethought the necessity of centralized control and the nature of regulation.195
Corporate models involve less parochialism, tend to be task oriented rather than
process oriented, and emphasize cooperation and efficiency.196 Such models are
especially beneficial in transnational contexts, where labyrinthine layers of
regulation may create only an illusion of process while inhibiting effectual
oversight.197 The desirability of voluntary, or private, regulations has arisen from
public law’s inability to keep pace with the necessities of commerce, as well as the
absence of a universal enforcement framework—indeed, the unworkability of such
a framework.198 The scholarship of transnational legal pluralism deals extensively
with transparency and accountability in transnational industries, as well as means
of realizing these goals.199 The primacy of these goals intends to bring business and
privately regulated industries back under the umbrella of regulation by creating an
avenue for a democratic citizenry, through its government, to supervise actions
affecting national policy aims.200 The following suggestions for structural changes
to P3 arrangements foster stability and efficiency—with the resultant
profitability—that produced functional governance standards in the corporate and
transnational contexts.201
Where rights and duties are not defined in the contract or enforceable within
juridical or administrative frameworks, private parties may compensate by
developing unsanctioned, private regulations with attendant transparency and
accountability issues,202 or by disregarding outright costly or inconvenient
regulations.203 In either case, this neocorporatist process endangers the P3’s
democratically sanctioned public welfare aims.204 The keys to successful corporate
governance are its cooperative nature and horizontal integration, whereas the
present regulatory system relies heavily on vertical integration.205 Corporate

195. See, e.g., IAN HARDEN, THE CONTRACTING STATE 14–26 (Norman Lewis & Cosmo
Graham eds., 1992).
196. See AMAN, supra note 50, at 121–22.
197. See, e.g., Andrew D. Mitchell & John Farnik, Global Administrative Law: Can It
Bring Global Governance to Account?, 37 FED. L. REV. 237, 250 (2009).
198. See generally id. at 237–58.
199. See, e.g., id.
200. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 298.
201. See LIKOSKY, supra note 33, at 23.
202. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 298; see also STEETS, supra note 44, at 48
(“[W]herever power is exercised there should be mechanisms of accountability.” (citation
omitted)).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 89–97.
204. See AMAN, supra note 50, at 143 (“Neocorporatist mentality sidesteps traditional
democratic processes with technocratic and managerial solutions. . . . [I]t is a risk to
democracy.”); see also Boddewyn, supra note 39, at 196 (“The major point here is that
government relations have to be intelligently managed like any other function of the
enterprise, rather than neglected, improvised, or let go wild.”).
205. See DAVID G. FREDERICKSON & H. GEORGE FREDERICKSON, MEASURING THE
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governance networks, or horizontally integrated structures, have not entirely
replaced vertical integration but, when adopted, have shifted the paradigm of
regulation.206 Horizontal integration offers promising efficiency incentives to
private parties in P3s: greater participatory planning in regulatory measures207 and
less-restrictive oversight mechanisms through industry-wide, competitive
self-policing measures.208
Other useful measures derived from corporate legal models are tax and subsidy
incentives tied to stringent compliance standards, thus enhancing efficiency while
reducing costs and burdens to both public and private parties.209 By embedding
watchdog overseers able to quickly approve or disapprove critical measures, or
establishing ex ante unlimited liability for contractors who either fail to institute or
conform to reasonable standards, the government could align BP’s interests with its
own public welfare interests. As an added benefit, the noninvasive and efficient
nature of the regulations will entice future extractors to comply with the
regulations.
In order to align public and private interests, public partners must create
incentives that make compliance desirable and profitable to the private party, not
simply an obstacle to business. In BP’s case, ignoring safety measures was
preferable to regulatory compliance due to cost overruns that resulted from
construction delays.210 Structuring the Macondo lease as a joint venture rather than
a fixed-price contract could have included cost-sharing provisions for exploration
in exchange for greater share of profits than were available under the fixed-price
contract.211 This measure would have reduced BP’s incentive to cut exploration
costs. The United States may also align public and private incentives by changing
its assumptions when entering the negotiation process.212 Shorter contract periods
will require more frequent assessments of the parties’ goals and demand a greater
PERFORMANCE OF THE HOLLOW STATE 12–13 (2006).
206. See AMAN, supra note 50, at 96–98.
207. The commission tasked with determining the causes of the Spill and making
recommendations for reform have propounded at least one aspect of a horizontally integrated
strategy in recommending that independent scientists from federal agencies be consulted at
the negotiation stage. See ‘Shared Failure’ in BP Spill Cited in Panel Report, supra note 23.
208. See Helgesson, supra note 80, at 24 (under a market regulation scheme, the
“business sector is expected to help produce frameworks for governing itself by creating
industry standards, codes of conduct, and other rules as a complement to, or even substitute
for, intra- and interstate regulation”); see also AMAN, supra note 50, at 96 (discussing the
positive results of the Environmental Protection Agency adopting horizontal governance
mechanisms).
209. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 164.
210. Joe Carroll & Katarzyna Klimasinska, BP Cost-Cutting, Conflicts Preceded Gulf
Disaster,
U.S.
Says,
BLOOMBERG.COM
(Sept.
14,
2011,
4:26
PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-14/bp-transocean-halliburton-faulted-by-u-s-in2010-gulf-spill.html.
211. See OMOROGBE, supra note 60, at 65 (noting that the Nigerian government is entitled
to 60% of profits in its joint ventures); see also Hahn, supra note 42 (noting the United
States bargained for roughly 12% of profits in its lease with BP).
212. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 184 (“[T]he presentation of P3 accountability in the
U.S. context is a nonissue because of the win-win nature of the approach is a naive
projection of joviality on what must be hard-nosed bargaining.”).
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degree of transparency. The BP lease was for five years,213 whereas a shorter term
could allow for an easier adjustment of priorities and policies. More flexible
contracts are also a means of reducing the cost and volatility of unscheduled
renegotiation.214 By negotiating directly with smaller players rather than allowing
the primary to engage them as subcontractors, the United States can enter into
horizontally integrated agreements regulated by task-oriented entities created for
the purpose. Another reform would be to contract on as comprehensive a range of
issues as possible. The result of inadequate drafting makes litigation more likely,
increasing costs and relegating questions of accountability to the postdisaster
environment rather than the negotiation phase.215 The measures listed here intend to
align incentives and ensure that regulation is both effective and noninvasive.
The key to adopting corporate legal models in P3 arrangements is to promote
cooperation and align the parties’ incentives to meet public welfare aims. Not all of
the suggestions above should be applied in every case, but each is an option to be
weighed in transnational P3s when economic stakes are high, moral hazard exists,
and a potentially burdensome regulatory structure may incent bad behavior with
disastrous consequences.
2. Government as Fiduciary: Stronger Bargaining for Public Welfare
In addition to its role as a private contractor seeking to maximize its economic
benefit under the P3 arrangement,216 the government has a duty to bargain for the
public welfare.217 The unwillingness of the United States government, under the
present paradigm, to negotiate more strenuously with prospective transnational
partners is a major concern.218 This Note advocates more proactive use of the
government’s inherent powers to control operators within its jurisdictional reach.
Government responsibility for public welfare entails aggressive bargaining not
only for direct economic benefits, but also for indirect benefits such as labor,
employment, natural resource protection, and infrastructure development, as well as
other national interests that maximize economic development.219 Though the Act is
an ex post acknowledgment of this duty, effective ex ante measures may include

213. See Braden Reddall, Transocean Rig Loss’s Financial Impact Mulled, REUTERS
(Apr. 22, 2010, 4:37 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2211325420100422.
214. Extraction contracts in the oil and gas industry are notoriously poor at providing for
conflict resolution and adaptation mechanisms. See OMOROGBE, supra note 60, at 5.
215. LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 191.
216. See, e.g., LOXLEY WITH LOXLEY, supra note 33, at 176 (“The apparent motivation
behind the approach [of creating P3s] has shifted to some degree from an attempt to move
infrastructure spending and debt off the government books, to a desire to reduce costs
through transferring risk to the private sector.”); Beermann, supra note 38, at 204
(“Economic development is often advanced as a reason for creating public-private
partnerships.”).
217. See LIKOSKY, supra note 33, at 23–25 (arguing that where the government assigns
public duties to a private party, it retains the duty to supervise that entity).
218. See supra notes 177–80.
219. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 298 (“[T]he government has a fiduciary duty to
ensure the advancement of its domestic constituency.”).
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delineating policy goals and devising structures to ensure these goals are
voluntarily embraced by the private partner as well.220 Contracting horizontally
with the subcontractors rather than vertically through primary contractors can
ensure that all parties are aware of the public policy goals contemplated by the P3
arrangement.221 Cross-subsidization of less-attractive aspects of the project may
reduce the desirability of subcontracting to parties who are difficult to regulate or
reach, and operate as another means to align private and public welfare interests by
evenly distributing the wealth generated by the P3.222 Broader horizontal
integration and contracting directly with parties rather than primaries that
subcontract are means of keeping enforcement costs down and public/private
interests aligned.223
Enhanced ex ante negotiation is not immune from one major drawback of the
Act: indirect costs to the public side from burdensome terms imposed upon the
private party. The United States’ desirability as an investment location may
diminish if private transnationals perceive third-party input at the negotiation stage
as inimical to their interests.224 However, the United States is presently the home to
the thirteenth-largest proven oil reserves in the world.225 Neither the Act nor the
measures proposed in this Note will eradicate the geographic benefits of drilling in
the United States. In light of this, a logical question is: why worry about
renegotiation at all? The public party should seek to eschew the moral hazard and
concomitant disregard for public welfare aims enabled by a renegotiation regime.
Private parties also stand to gain when the public party’s incentives to renegotiate
are minimized. A predictable regulatory system is ultimately more efficient and
cheaper for private parties than the Russian-roulette style liability in place now,
where the private party can flout rules until the resultant liability threatens the
survival of the company itself.226 In addition, renegotiation exacerbates volatility,
which acutely affects securities prices.227 When volatility results in part from the

220. See Boddewyn, supra note 39, at 196 (“The major point here is that government
relations have to be intelligently managed like any other function of the enterprise, rather
than neglected, improvised, or let go wild.”).
221. LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 164 (calling for articulation of public policy interest
applicable to all contractors).
222. Id. (suggesting cross-subsidization as one inducement to responsible behavior as a
means to avoid the contractors’ competition for the most profitable aspects of a project and
thereby balkanizing the whole).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 205–08.
224. See Peters & Pierre, supra note 54, at 45 (“[P]ublic sector actors are increasingly
dependent on financial resources from the private sector for public investment, but private
sector interests have fewer and fewer incentives to engage the public sector, for instance in
public-private partnerships.”).
WORLD
FACTBOOK
(2011),
available
at
225. CIA
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html.
226. BP’s stock price was so harmed by the Gulf Oil Spill that BP was susceptible to a
takeover. Loren Steffy, The Return of BP Takeover Speculation, CHRON.COM (Dec. 17, 2010,
11:26 AM), http://blogs.chron.com/lorensteffy/2010/12/the_return_of_b_1.html.
227. Hans Wagner, Volatility’s Impact on Market Returns, INVESTOPEDIA.COM (May 7,
2008), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/financial-theory/08/volatility.asp
(“When volatility increases, risk increases and returns decrease.”).
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security issuer’s own negligence, it may create further costs in the form of security
holders’ litigation.228 A more effective regulatory scheme would greatly reduce the
risk of volatility in large-capitalization extractors’ stock prices, protecting wealth
and domestic investments.229 In a real sense, regulation can operate as a form of
insurance for these companies, whereas renegotiation is a gamble that public
industries, such as massive transnationals, would be better off avoiding.230
For the time being, the United States enjoys significant geographical
advantages, with profits realizable independent of modest cost increases in the
negotiation process. Private and public parties tend to profit handsomely from
successful P3s in the United States231 and can prospectively negotiate for a more
balanced arrangement if costs are anticipated to increase as the result of structural
changes. By bargaining for a wider range of public interests at the negotiation
stage, the United States will reduce the likelihood of unpredictable, indirect
economic and environmental costs associated with a regime that sanctions
renegotiation as a viable alternative to inclusive, ex ante negotiation.
The efficacy of the efficient-state model depends in part on willingness by the
government to strenuously negotiate for public welfare interests,232 to take its
difficult-to-monetize public welfare interests as seriously as its economic
interests.233 The participation of subcontractors, NGOs, independent advisory
experts, and representatives from local industries in the negotiation process could
serve to effectively outsource the monetization studies to those industries, making a
project’s cost-benefit analysis more reliable than one derived solely from either P3
party. The present model is that of a state acting largely on behalf of entrenched
economic and administrative interests to the detriment of broader public welfare
interests.234 Overall, the implementation of even some of the ideas suggested in this
Note will increase the efficiency of the process, reduce back-end costs for both
public and private parties, and increase the likelihood that future negotiations will
better represent a broader scope of public welfare aims while maximizing
long-term profitability for both parties to transnational P3s.

228. See Oil Spill Hits BP’s Stock, Threatens Its Future, supra note 13; see also Bates,
supra note 63 (discussing costs of securities litigation stemming from material misstatements
from BP).
229. See Wagner, supra note 227.
230. LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 288 (“[I]t is not always clear that shifts in the nature of
partnerships [due to renegotiation] result in more equitable outcomes.”).
231. See Hahn, supra note 42 (noting that the United States received over $6.5 billion
from exploratory leases in 2009); see also Graham, supra note 165 (noting that BP’s profits
should be sufficient to pay clean-up costs).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 177–80.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 117–20.
234. As noted by the executive director of an environmental group at the time of the
Spill, “[MMS’s] oversight role has devolved to little more than rubber-stamping British
Petroleum’s self-serving drilling plans.” Eilperin, supra note 17 (quoting Kierán Suckling,
Executive Director, Center for Biological Diversity).
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CONCLUSION
The Gulf Oil Spill and its aftermath, including the moratorium and the Big Oil
Bailout Prevention Unlimited Liability Acts, throw into relief the inadequacy of
existing forms of regulation and P3 contract negotiation. Not merely reforming, but
rethinking the American regulatory model is necessary to better ensure the
representation of both public and private aims in transnational P3 arrangements. By
embracing an efficient-state regulatory model, the administrative, litigation, and
implementation costs of P3s can be greatly reduced, saving the public money.
Unexpected costs to taxpayers can be more equitably absorbed by insurers and
private parties when negotiated for ex ante. The model would also increase
transparency, accountability, efficiency, and participation while giving public
welfare actors more input into P3 negotiations.
An enhanced bargaining process with representatives from the widest
practicable range of affected third parties benefits the private parties of P3s in that
it will better contemplate risk assignment and thereby reduce the likelihood of
unilateral renegotiations, increase the likelihood that well-defined policy goals will
be included in the contract, and create more-detailed information for the private
parties’ insurer. Enhanced contract negotiations will reduce volatility in the P3
arrangement and reduce the need for invasive regulation, thus stabilizing private
parties’ expectations and increasing overall efficiency. Even if private parties are
reluctant to adopt higher front-end costs that may arise from participation of a
wider range of interests in the negotiation process, the government has tools to
enhance cooperation: tax subsidies for compliance with safety standards; costsharing agreements; delegation of market-based regulatory measures through
horizontal integration of subcontractors, contractors, public interest groups, and
oversight agencies; shorter contract periods; structuring the agreement based on
responsibly assessed risk preferences; and the threat of higher insurance
requirements, among a multitude of other possibilities.
The Big Oil Bailout Prevention Unlimited Liability Act of 2011 represents much
of what is wrong in the regulatory system in the United States. It is a
backward-looking measure that does little to safeguard the public interest beyond
mitigating financial losses235 arising from a preventable disaster.236
Backward-looking measures like the Act are inevitable only where ex ante
measures are insufficient to adequately safeguard both public and private aims. In
order to avoid such ineffectual measures in the future, the U.S. government must
adopt more efficient regulatory and negotiation processes. Winston Churchill once
quipped that “democracy is the worst form of government except for all the others
that have been tried . . . .”237 It could also be said today that renegotiation is the
worst form of contract remedy except for all the others that have been tried.

235. LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 166 (“To make transparency backward-looking
embraces a concept of forensic accountability that is not suited to progressive public interest
minded planning.”).
236. See generally NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND
OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra note 93, at 225–26.
237. JAMES C. HUMES, THE WIT & WISDOM OF WINSTON CHURCHILL 28 (Harper Perennial
1995) (1994).
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Efficient-state regulation will reduce administrative costs as compared to those of
the present regulatory paradigm. Furthermore, the enhanced contract negotiation
process fundamental to efficient-state regulation will better protect American
public welfare interests and reduce costs for transnational parties by protecting
against unpredictable policy shifts. Effective administration and efficient
contracting will greatly reduce or eliminate the financial, environmental, public
relations, business disruption, and compliance costs associated with measures like
the moratorium and the Big Oil Bailout Prevention Unlimited Liability Act of
2011.

